A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

基于DPA的LED非线性部件逆向研究

在军事和商业应用中有很多密码算法是半公开或者不公开的,旨在证明算法保密对密码的安全性提高并没有明显帮助．针对轻型分组密码LED的未知非线性部件S盒,提出了一种基于差分功耗分析的逆向方法,该方法可以利用差分功耗曲线的极性信息来恢复未知算法结构．实验结果表明,在LED的S盒参数未知时,利用功耗采集平台采集算法运行时泄露的旁路功耗信息,可以成功逆向出全部s盒信息,验证了该方法的可行性．     

攻击主动防御飞行器的微分对策制导律

基于微分对策理论设计了躲避护卫弹的同时攻击飞行器的制导律。根据传统的性能指标推导了该场景的微分对策制导律,并且根据权重系数的取值定义了三种制导律:最优追赶制导律、逃脱-追赶制导律和复合制导律。最优追赶制导律容易被护卫弹拦截,逃脱-追赶制导律容易造成导弹和飞行器的零控脱靶量急剧增大而使得攻击失败,复合制导律很难选择合适的权重系数。针对以上不足,提出了两种改进的制导律,并对该两种制导律的适用情况进行了分析。通过非线性模型仿真,验证了这两种方法的可行性。该两种制导律目的性强,攻击导弹可以躲避护卫弹进而攻击飞行器。     

ARIA分组密码差分功耗分析

分析了密码算法加密过程的功耗泄露模型,给出了差分功耗分析的基本原理,针对ARIA分组密码中查找S盒的功耗泄漏进行了差分功耗分析,并进行仿真实验。实验结果表明：ARIA密码中S盒查表操作功耗消耗易遭受差分功耗攻击,对800个随机明文的功耗曲线进行实验分析,可获取ARIA加密前4轮轮密钥,结合密钥扩展算法即可获取128位的主密钥。     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

地方物流供应商“偷懒”行为监管机制研究

军民融合现代军事物流体系中,地方物流供应商往往会"偷懒",这必将损害军民融合现代军事物流体系的整体绩效。首先描述了"偷懒"行为及其危害性,从机制入手,基于博弈论建立地方物流供应商"偷懒"行为监管机制;分析并证明了监管机制的有效性。这一机制的构建对于监管地方物流供应商具有重要作用。     

基于微分求积法的高超声速机翼蒙皮颤振研究

机翼蒙皮在高超声速气流中会发生颤振等气动弹性问题,破坏结构.引入微分求积方法,可以有效地分析机翼蒙皮的颤振问题.将机翼蒙皮等效成薄板,基于一阶活塞理论,根据克希霍夫假设及弹性理论建立蒙皮的气动弹性偏微分方程,采用微分求积法将偏微分方程离散为常微分方程,并根据频率重合理论对颤振问题进行求解.得到的颤振速度与有限元方法计算结果进行比较,误差为0 58％,验证了微分求积法在求解颤振偏微分方程时的有效性.分析了蒙皮面积、厚度、纵横比等不同参数对蒙皮颤振速度的影响.结果表明,颤振速度随蒙皮面积的增大而减小,随纵横比、厚度的增大而增大.